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Abstract 
 
When an incumbent faces a new entrant with 
superior capabilities, it may preemptively announce 
(preannounce) its future product to avoid forfeiting 
users. The traditional focus of preannouncement 
literature has been on truth-telling and vaporware. In 
the age of social media, the proliferation of online 
discussion forums and social network usage leads to 
the formation of public opinions (signals) that may 
not be in sync with firm’s private information 
regarding its forthcoming innovation. Further, 
vigilance by consumers and media outlets induce 
high ex-post cost on vaporware making it infeasible 
in such settings. Then, when should firm announce or 
remain silent in modern settings? Under what 
conditions should the firm pursue innovation in 
presence of uncertainties in public signals in addition 
to its own private information? How does presence of 
network effects influence the preannouncement 
strategy of the firm? We find that the incumbent 
follows a preannouncement strategy (truth-telling or 
silence) if the public signal associated with it is 
moderate. Further, network effects has a negative 
impact on prices and incumbent may innovate only if 
the entrant’s relative ability to leverage network 
effects is low. 
 
Keywords: preannouncement, network effect, 
competition, signaling, silentware, product 
differentiation. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Consumers frequently face the dilemma of 
choosing to stay with their current firm or migrate to 
a competing firm with superior technology. To 
combat competition from a new entrant, an 
incumbent firm may preempt the market with an 
announcement (preannouncement) of its future 
innovation. The purpose of a preannouncement is to 
provide a signal to the market, especially its existing 
user base that there is value in delaying their decision 
to switch until the promised time of delivery. 
The extant literature on product introduction 
through preannouncements has focused on true 
preannouncement, strategic false preannouncement 
(vaporware) and no preannouncement. With the 
advent of social media, consumers form belief 
regarding the success of the preannouncement based 
on discussions on consumer forums and other social 
media platforms. Sentiments on such platforms 
driven by user generated content leads to public 
opinion regarding a firm’s future product (capability, 
quality, features, pricing, etc.). While such a public 
signal can be somewhat controlled by making a 
truthful preannouncement, positive or negative 
sentiments regarding a product could spread rapidly 
through social media leading to discordant beliefs 
regarding its success. In case the firm chooses to 
remain silent, in absence of a clear commitment, such 
public opinions are often based on strategic or 
undesired product information leaks by the firm, its 
competition or other sources. The traditional focus of 
preannouncement literature in economics, marketing 
and information systems has been on vaporware. 
However, with anti-trust laws and the power of 
opinion formation of new age media channels (such 
as public forums, social networks, vigilant media 
houses tracking vaporware e.g., Wired Magazine 
Vaporware Awards), firms now rarely indulge in 
strategic false preannouncements due to the high ex-
post cost of vaporware. Thus, in the modern era of 
social media, based on truthful preannouncement or 
the lack of it, public signals generated through such 
channels can lead to over optimism or strong 
pessimism regarding a product. The role of such 
public signals on preannouncement strategies has not 
been sufficiently addressed in the extant literature 
and forms the primary focus area of this paper.  
Further, products in several industries such as 
software and consumer electronics are characterized 
by network effects where the value of the product 
increases with the number of its users [16]. The 
extant literature is not clear regarding the role of 
network effects on preannouncement strategies in 
product markets. While some suggest that the 
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 presence of network effects makes preannouncement 
beneficial for the firm, others have shown the 
benefits of silence in such settings. The extant 
literature has not studied the role of network effects 
on preannouncement strategies in presence of 
uncertainties in public and private signals in settings 
that characterize the modern technology landscape in 
the age of social media. We explore the role of 
network effects in such settings and this forms the 
second focus of this paper. 
 While truthful preannouncement may help the 
incumbent manage consumer expectations better, it 
may attract undesired strategic behavior from the new 
entrant firm (e.g., competitive pricing). By contrast, 
while silence may be useful for the incumbent in 
misleading competing firms, it could have a 
detrimental effect of not being able to manage 
consumer expectations in the desired manner. Thus, 
an incumbent firm must take into consideration the 
expectations of consumers as well as that of a 
competitor before choosing its preannouncement 
strategy. The following examples from the consumer 
electronics market illustrate the challenges firms face 
in choosing their preannouncement strategy. 
In 2010, when Apple’s marked its entry into the 
tablet market with the announcement of iPad, the 
incumbent HP was still working on its next 
innovation HP Slate 500. HP chose not to 
preannounce and remained silent regarding its 
product’s features.  However, HP’s silent strategy did 
not go down well with consumers and even impacted 
its stock prices negatively [27]. Given that HP was 
the market leader in this segment at that point in time, 
should HP have preannounced its forthcoming 
product features truthfully?  
A contrasting future event involving the two firms 
provides additional insight. In 2011, Apple 
announced its next version iPad 2. In response HP 
preannounced HP TouchPad with clear commitment 
to specific product features. The preannouncement 
led to a strong public signal regarding the success of 
the future product. Media covering technology 
products considered HP TouchPad to be “twice as 
powerful” and have “a better piece of software” 
[28]. Consumer sentiments on public forums were 
also positive and they felt that “HP has the money 
and market share to make their product a success” 
and were willing to delay their purchase decision till 
the release of HP TouchPad [29]. We now know that 
in spite of undertaking R&D efforts, HP failed to 
deliver and Apple became the market leader in tablet 
industry. However, HP was indeed successful in 
creating dilemma among HP tablet users who delayed 
their switching decision [30,31]. Why did HP’s 
strategy of making a committed preannouncement 
work but its silent innovation strategy fail? Given 
HP’s strong reputation based on market share at that 
time it is indeed possible that public signal associated 
with announcement strengthened consumer belief in 
the product’s successful delivery while its silence 
may have led to rumor mill resulting in a weak public 
signal associated with product success. In addition to 
the public signal, the firm must consider its private 
signal regarding the success of its innovation before 
devising its preannouncement strategy. 
The incumbent firm has good understanding 
regarding the true chance of success of its future 
product (a private signal) and bases its decision to 
undertake development and preannouncement 
strategy accordingly. Our insights into the interplay 
between the private and public signal on 
preannouncement strategy is another aspect of our 
research contribution.  
We find that the incumbent innovates when its 
private signal is sufficiently high. Such an incumbent 
engages in a truthful preannouncement strategy if the 
associated public signal is moderate. For low or high 
values of public signal, the innovating firm will be 
silent. By contrast, if the public signal is moderate, 
the incumbent firm will engage in a silent strategy, 
otherwise it shall preannounce. We show that the 
ability of firms to leverage network effects has a 
negative impact on prices, and the incumbent firm 
innovates only when the entrant’s ability to leverage 
network effects is low. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We 
discuss relevant literature in Section 2. The model is 
described in section 3 and sections 4 and 5 
encompasses the analysis. We conclude the paper in 
Section 6. 
 
2. Relevant Literature  
 
Preannouncement is a signaling strategy used by 
firms to target users before the actual launch of the 
product [13]. Unlike announcements few weeks 
before the official launch of the product, a 
preannouncement is specifically targeted to preempt 
the market and prevent customers from switching to a 
rival product. The extant literature on new product 
preannouncement (NPP) does not distinguish 
between the two, leading to discordant results of the 
impact of preannouncement strategies [20]. The focus 
of the NPP literature has been on the decision to 
preannounce [4,7,23,26], timing of preannouncement 
[17,19,20], rationale behind preannouncement [8,13] 
and content of the preannouncement [24]. Other 
studies have studied diffusion of preannounced 
products [25], vaporware [2,6] and user welfare [11, 
12,18].  
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 The preemption literature discusses firm 
strategies for product pricing, preannouncement, 
timing and markets without network externalities [3, 
9,10]. Gerlach [12] discusses the effect of 
announcement by a new entrant and the resulting 
reaction of the incumbent to preempt by cutting 
prices in a market where users have switching costs. 
In equilibrium, the new entrant does not always 
announce, and not announcing increases the ex-ante 
total welfare. Gerlach [12] also shows that users can 
be better off with a ban on announcement. Choi et al. 
[5] show that incentive for preannouncements are 
stronger in markets with network effects. In such 
markets preannouncements can be used to induce the 
delay of users' purchases and forestall the build-up of 
rival products' installed bases. The extant literature 
suggests that ‘vague’ preannouncements [20] may 
not have a strong influence on users and that 
information should be clear and informative. 
However, the literature also acknowledges that firms 
may not have an incentive to make clear 
preannouncements for the fear of product 
cannibalization, loss of reputation due to inability to 
deliver, and reaction from competition. The costs and 
benefits of preannouncement are different for users 
and firms, and these are less explored issues 
especially in a market where the new entrant arrives 
with a superior technology and where there is 
uncertainty regarding incumbent’s ability to 
successfully deliver a preannounced technology on 
time [20]. 
While a firm may be truthful in its intention and 
fail to deliver, it may also choose to strategically lie 
about its intention to deliver in the future. In the 
computer hardware and software industry, such false 
preannouncements are called ‘vaporware’ [12, 15]. In 
the late 1980s, vaporware had reached epidemic 
proportions [21]. As a result, a council was formed in 
1990 with several firms including HP and Sybase to 
issue a report to discourage ‘vaporware’ because of 
its negative impact on the industry’s capability [22]. 
With antitrust laws in place, press following pre-
announcements closely (e.g., Wired Magazine 
Vaporware Awards) and social media giving the 
users a common platform to express their opinion and 
discontent, the high ex-post cost of ‘vaporware’ 
makes it an infeasible preannouncement strategy in 
many industries. In this paper, when an incumbent 
faces a new entrant technology, we are particularly 
interested in its choice from two possible 
preannouncement strategies: (i) truthful 
preannouncement and (ii) no preannouncement 
(silence). When the firm is silent, it is however 
possible that it undertakes product development 
efforts. It should be noted that even though the firm 
preannounces truthfully, it may still fail to deliver 
due to unforeseen circumstances such as failure in 
supply chain, R&D efforts etc. In the event of such 
failure, the firm incurs an ex-post cost for its failure 
and its ability to price its product is also impacted 
negatively. A sufficiently high ex-post cost addresses 
moral hazard issues that a firm may have.  
Our work attempts to bridge a gap in extant 
literature by analyzing the effect of uncertainty 
regarding the success of an innovation (public and 
private signals) and network effects on a firm’s 
decision to innovate and preannounce. Based on 
several factors such as incumbent’s reputation, 
technology ceiling, information dissemination 
through channels such as social media and online 
discussion forums, incumbent’s preannouncement 
strategy, etc. a public opinion (signal) is formed 
regarding the feasibility of delivery of the next 
technology frontier by the incumbent. Further, a firm 
also has a private signal regarding its success through 
better understanding of it organizational capabilities. 
With the predominant role of social media in 
formation of public signals regarding a future 
product’s success, it is crucial for firms to understand 
how to incorporate both private information and 
public sentiment to design its preannouncement 
strategy. We identify preannouncement strategies 
under different levels of private and public signals in 
our model. Further, in several industries such as 
consumer electronics, software, etc. products are 
characterized by network effects. Unlike extant 
literature that proposes that network effects creates 
stronger motivation for preannouncement, we find 
scenarios where network effects hinders 
preannouncement, and innovation by the incumbent 
depends not only on network effects but on the 
relative ability of the firms to leverage network 
effects. 
 
3. Model Description 
 
Using a stylized three stage model, we study a 
duopoly of competing on product/service innovation 
capability in a market with network effects, i.e., the 
firm’s product offering becomes more attractive and 
valuable as more consumers adopt and use it. 
Consumers are horizontally differentiated in their 
taste for product characteristics and are uniformly 
distributed along a Hotelling line [14] between 0 and 
1, with transportation cost parameter t  representing 
their taste preference and disutility from being a unit 
distance away from their ideal product preference. 
This is consistent with the scenarios in consumer 
electronics and other markets of interest where 
consumers are driven by their taste preferences. 
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 Consumers derive additive utility from - (i) an 
intrinsic value from the capability offered by the 
incumbent, and (ii) value from network effects 
generated by the product/service. This assumption on 
utility function is consistent with characteristics of 
several markets such as cellphones, tablets etc. where 
devices have an inherent capability and can also be 
used to communicate or collaborate with other users 
in the network to leverage network effect. The 
incumbent (entrant) firm’s ability to leverage 
network effect is represented by network effect 
parameter ( )
i e
  [1]. For example, if the market-
share of the incumbent’s product is m , then the value 
derived from the network effect is 
i
m  where 0
i
   
and 0 1m  . Higher the network effect parameter, 
greater is the ability of the firm to leverage network 
effect and provide higher network effects to its 
consumers [16]. 
In stage 0, the incumbent located at one extreme 
of the Hotelling line covers the market with 
capability c . In stage 1, a new entrant firm locates 
itself at the other extreme of the Hotelling line and 
offers a superior capability
e
c   . The incumbent at 
this stage is faced with three decisions – Should it 
undertake innovation efforts? If the incumbent 
innovates, then should it preannounce its future 
delivery in stage 2 and what price should it charge for 
its product/service in both stages? The incumbent has 
a private signal (0 1)    regarding the probability 
of its successful innovation. Thus, with probability   
it can deliver
i
c    in stage 2. If the incumbent fails 
in its innovation efforts, it continues to maintain its 
version of the product with capability c in stage 2. 
The innovation 
i
  that the incumbent may undertake 
is common knowledge (consider it to be the next 
frontier in technology) and is known to the entrant as 
well as consumers. However, the entrant and 
consumers do not know  but get a signal 
A
  if the 
incumbent preannounces and 
S
  if the incumbent is 
silent. 
A
  (or 
S
 ) are probabilities that the entrant 
and consumers associate with the successful delivery 
of 
i
c    by the incumbent in stage 2 if the 
incumbent preannounces (or is silent). The incumbent 
is aware of the public signal based on its 
preannouncement strategy. Having recently delivered 
a technology, we assume that the entrant is not in a 
position to undertake R&D efforts for the next 
technology frontier [20]. Such inability of the entrant 
is common in industries where the incumbent is a 
large firm with an installed base while the new 
entrant is a start-up firm or in an industry where 
technology has reached a saturation point in the short 
run and new innovation takes sufficient time and 
effort. The entrant, however can use price as a 
strategic lever to compete against the incumbent in 
stages 1 and 2. In stage 2, the incumbent’s new 
version of the product (if innovation was undertaken 
successfully) is revealed. Consumers re-valuate their 
adoption decisions based on available technology and 
pricing. If the incumbent fails to deliver in spite of 
preannouncement in stage 1, it suffers a reputation 
cost in stage 2.  We begin our analysis with stage 2 
(in Section 4) and evaluate the equilibrium prices and 
market shares depending on its preannouncement 
strategies. We then analyze stage 1 (in Section 5) to 
determine market characteristics suitable for 
incumbent’s preannouncement strategies. 
 
4. Stage 2 Analysis 
 
We analyze stage 2 based on three possible 
strategies in stage 1 – (i) Strategy A - when the 
incumbent preannounces in stage 1, (ii) Strategy SI   
- when the incumbent silently innovates in stage 1, 
and (iii) Strategy S  - when the incumbent is silent 
and does not innovate. The incumbent firm sets 
prices after realization of success of innovation (if 
undertaken) and the entrant firm reacts accordingly. 
Consumers observe the revised prices and revisit 
their adoption decisions in stage 2. 
 
4.1. Incumbent Preannounced in Stage 1  
 
     The utility of a consumer indifferent between the 
incumbent and the new entrant in stage 2 is given as 
 
 
  
2 2 2
2 2 2
1
i A i i A i A
e A e e A e A
U c t m p
U c t m p


     
      
  (1.1) 
In equation(1.1), 
2 A
m  is the incumbent’s equilibrium 
market share of consumers and 
2 2
( )
i A e A
p p is the 
equilibrium price that the consumers are willing to 
pay to the incumbent (entrant). The profits of the two 
competing firms are given as 
 
2 2 2
2 2 2
(1 )
i A i A A
e A e A A
p m
p m



 
  (1.2) 
 
Similarly, the utility of consumers and profits of 
firms when the incumbent fails to deliver in stage 2 
in spite of preannouncement in stage 1 are 
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 
  
2 2 2
2 2 2
1
i A i A i A
e A e e A e A
U c t m p
U c t m p


   
      
  (1.3) 
 
2 2 2 1
2 2 2
(1 )
i A i A A A A
e A e A A
p m m
p m
 

 
 
  (1.4) 
 
     In equation(1.4), 
1A A
m  is the reputation cost that 
the firm bears when it fails to deliver in spite of a 
public signal
A
 . Incumbent’s failure to deliver in 
stage 2 impacts all users who chose not to switch to 
the entrant in stage 1
1
( )
A
m based on the 
preannouncement. For simplicity, we assume a 
simple cost function that signifies that the cost 
increases in the number of users who remained with 
the incumbent and becomes intensified with the 
public signal
A
 . This ex-post cost ensures that moral 
hazard is not an issue. In other words, if external 
factors such as vigilant media and consumer 
discussion on social media channels is not a 
sufficient deterrent for the firm to engage in 
vaporware, this technical aspect of the model can 
ensure that ‘vaporware’ is indeed an infeasible 
strategy. Note that development cost for innovation is 
undertaken in stage 1. We can solve for the 
equilibrium market share (as a function of prices) by 
equating equations(1.1) and(1.3). Simultaneously 
solving the first order conditions of profits with 
respect to the respective firm’s price we can compute 
the equilibrium prices [1]. 
 
4.2. Incumbent Silently Innovated in Stage 1 
  
     The utilities of the indifferent consumer upon 
success or failure of the incumbent are similar to 
equations (1.1) and (1.3). The equilibrium market 
share of users upon successful delivery of 
i
c    by 
the incumbent is 
2 SI
m  and equilibrium prices charged 
by the incumbent and new entrant are 
2i SI
p  and
2e SI
p  
respectively. Similarly, when the silently innovating 
incumbent fails, the equilibrium market share is
2 S I
m . 
The equilibrium prices upon failure to deliver are 
2i SI
p  and
2e SI
p . The profit functions of the 
incumbent and the new entrant are similar to 
equations (1.2) and (1.4). However, the public signal 
that the entrant and consumer has regarding the 
success of the incumbent regarding delivery of the 
next technology frontier is
S
 .  
 
4.3 Silent Incumbent Did Not Innovate in Stage 1 
 
     When the silent incumbent chooses not to 
innovate, there is no notion of success or failure. The 
incumbent continues to deliver technology with 
capability c  in stage 2 albeit the incumbent still 
incurs a reputation cost based on the public 
signal
S
 regarding the incumbent’s success. The 
utility of the indifferent consumer is  
 
2 2 2
2 2 2
( )
( )(1 )
i S i S i S
e S e e S e S
U c t m p
U c t m p


   
      
  (1.5) 
Firms’ profits are given as 
 
2 2 2 1
2 2 2
(1 )
i S i S S S S
e S e S S
p m m
p m
 

 
 
  (1.6) 
 
Proposition 1: The stage 2 equilibrium prices of the 
incumbent and the entrant firm increases in t  and 
decreases in network effect parameters ( , )
i e
  . The 
equilibrium prices decreases at a higher rate with 
respect to the network effect parameter of the 
competing firm. 
 
[All proofs are in the Appendix] 
 
     Higher the transportation cost parameter t , higher 
is the disutility faced by the consumer from moving 
away from their ideal taste preference on the 
Hotelling line. Some products could be addictive and 
such habit forming products have high t . In such 
markets firms can charge a premium from consumers 
based on the strength of consumer’s taste preference. 
The presence of network effects reduces the price 
that the firm can charge because the firm has to offer 
more competitive prices in order to balance benefits 
of consumers with the competing firm. This suggests 
that prices are more competitive for products like 
cellphones, gaming consoles, etc. where network 
effects play a role. We will revisit the impact of 
network effect parameters in Section 5. 
  
5. Stage 1 Analysis 
 
In stage 1, the incumbent firm sets prices in 
accordance with the rational expectations of 
consumers and entrant based on public signal and 
incumbent’s preannouncement strategy. However, 
the incumbent firm has better information about the 
success of innovation of the next technology frontier. 
Thus, while making a decision on which 
preannouncement and innovation strategy to engage 
in, it takes its private signal into consideration. We 
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 analyze the incumbent’s preannouncement and 
pricing strategies in stage 1. 
 
5.1. Truthful Preannouncement 
      
     In this scenario, the utility of a consumer 
indifferent between the incumbent and new entrant is 
given as 
 
 
1 1 1
2 2
1 1 1
2 2
( )
( (1 ) )
( )(1 )
( (1 ) )
i A i A i A
A i A A i A
e A e e A e A
A e A A e A
U c t m p
U U
U c t m p
U U

  

  
   
  
      
  
  (1.7) 
 
Incumbent firm incurs development cost in stage 1. 
Firm profits are given as 
 
2
1 1 1
2 2
1 1 1
2 2
( (1 ) )
(1 )
( (1 ) )
i A i A A i
A i A A i A
e A e A A
A e A A e A
p m
p m
 
    

    
  
  
 
  
  (1.8) 
 
In the above equations,  0 1    is the discount 
factor that consumers and firms use in order to 
compute the expected value from the second stage. 
The discount factor reflects patience level of 
consumers and firms for the given timing of the 
stages. If patience level is low, consumers and firms 
discount future expected value heavily and base their 
decision on current period utilities and profits 
respectively. 
 
5.2. Silent Innovation 
 
     In this scenario, utility function of a consumer 
indifferent between the incumbent and entrant in 
stage 1 is similar to equation(1.7) with corresponding 
prices
1 1
( , )
i SI e SI
p p  and public signal ( )
S
  . Further, 
the profit functions are similar to equation(1.8). We 
can compute the equilibrium prices by 
simultaneously solving the first order conditions of 
firm’s profit with respect to its price. While 
proposition 1 extends to such prices as well, 
equilibrium prices upon innovation with a truthful or 
silent preannouncement is additionally impacted by 
the public signal regarding success of such an 
innovation effort. The equilibrium prices in stage 1 
for preannouncement strategy { , }k A SI  are shown 
below. 
 
1
1
3 2 (1 ) 2 (1 )
3
3 2 (1 ) (1 )
3
i e e k k
i k
i e e k k
e k
t
p
t
p
    
    
      

      

  (1.9) 
 
Proposition 2a: When the incumbent undertakes 
innovation in stage 1, the equilibrium prices of both 
firms increase in the public signal
k
 if 
0.5
k
  where  ,k A S  and vice versa. Further, 
the incumbent’s price in stage 1 increases at a higher 
rate with 
k
  relative to the entrant. 
 
     When the public signal is sufficiently high, 
incumbent can signal its commitment to innovation 
by charging a price that increases in the strength of 
the public signal. However, when the public signal is 
not strong enough, the incumbent can still signal its 
commitment to innovation by offering its product at a 
relatively lower price to offset expected payoff under 
uncertainty. This leads to some interesting dynamics 
for different industry scenarios. If the incumbent firm 
has a strong reputation for innovation (e.g., Apple) 
then it can charge a high price only if its 
announcement or silence both leads to high 
expectations regarding firm success. The cellphone 
industry has witnessed this effect with initial versions 
of Apple’s iPhone’s such as iPhone 4/4S. However, 
with iPhone 5C the expectations were very high, 
however the public sentiment based on Apple’s 
silence did not serve it well [32]. This may have led 
to heavy discount observed with iPhone 5c post 
launch. Would it have been more prudent for Apple 
that typically believes in maintaining silence to have 
made a preannouncement given the low innovation 
levels of iPhone 5c? In the following section, we will 
analyze equilibrium preannouncement strategy that 
enables the firm to optimize its profits. 
 
5.3. Silent with No Innovation 
 
     In this scenario, the incumbent firm does not 
undergo any cost related to innovation. The prices 
charged by the incumbent and entrant firms are
1i S
p  
and
1e S
p . The utilities of indifferent user and firm 
profits are similar to equations (1.7) and (1.8) where 
the public signal is
S
 . The equilibrium prices of 
firms are 
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1
1
3 2 2
3
3 2
3
i e e S
i S
i e e S
e S
t
p
t
p
  
  
    

    

  (1.10) 
  
Proposition 2b: When the incumbent does not 
undertake innovation in stage 1, the equilibrium 
prices of both firms increase in the public signal
S
 . 
Further, the incumbent’s price in stage 1 increases at 
a higher rate with 
S
  relative to the entrant. 
 
     Unlike incumbent’s innovation strategy, the stage 
1 equilibrium prices increase in the public signal. 
Silence may lead to heavy speculation and generation 
of strong rumors though social media channels. This 
possibility is typically high when an incumbent of 
high past reputation preempts the market with 
‘silentware’ and social media and other online 
channels of information dissemination lead to strong 
rumors. In such a scenario, an incumbent must be 
cautious of over enthusiasm by consumers an overtly 
strategic behavior by the entrant. Even if the public 
signal is not very strong, it helps the incumbent price 
its product higher as the signal strength increases. 
However, in the innovation strategy of the 
incumbent, the public signal needs to be strong 
enough to benefit pricing. While a preannouncement 
may not always be able to control the public signal, 
in scenarios when it can be controlled with more 
information via preannouncement, the incumbent 
benefits in doing so if its private signal is strong.  
 
Proposition 3: When incumbent finds it profitable to 
undertake innovation, for a given ˆ( )  , there exists 
thresholds
A
 ,
A
 (on
A
 ) and 
S
 ,
S
 (on
S
 ) such 
that the innovating incumbent chooses to  
a) preannounce if 
A A A
     and 
S S S
    .  
b) remain silent if 
S S S
    and 
A A A
    . 
 
     When the incumbent’s private signal is 
sufficiently high, it knows that it has a high chance of 
success with its innovation efforts. There exists a 
threshold ˆ on the incumbent’s private signal such 
that the incumbent chooses to innovate if ˆ  . 
Below this threshold, the incumbent remains silent 
irrespective of the public signal (refer to Figure 1 and 
Figure 2). This is primarily the reason why in the age 
of social media, silence if often interpreted as lack of 
innovation in industries where the technology ceiling 
for a product category has been reached. 
     A high strength of private signal does not 
necessarily mean that the incumbent will 
preannounce. Preannouncement is optimal for the 
firm if the public signal associated with 
preannouncement is moderate (refer to Figure 1a). 
For low and high public signals associated with 
preannouncement, an innovating firm should remain 
silent since these two regions are marked by market 
pessimism (low 
A
 ) and optimism (high 
A
 ) 
respectively. Committing to consumers via 
preannouncement leads to high ex-post cost in both 
scenarios. By contrast, if the public signal generated 
by silence leads to market pessimism (low 
S
 ) or 
optimism (high 
S
 ), firm is better off preannouncing 
in order to improve its ability to price in these regions 
of operations provided the expected public signal 
associated with preannouncement makes such a 
strategy feasible (refer to Figure 1b). The incumbent 
must be cautious in understanding the interplay 
between such public and private signals before 
choosing its preannouncement and innovation 
strategy.      
 
 
 
Fig. 1a.  Fig. 1b.  
Figure 1.  Preannouncement strategies for 
variation in incumbent’s private signal and public 
signal.  
 
     In Figure 2, the role of private information is 
illustrated in three scenarios. Figure 2a depicts the 
scenario when the private signal of the incumbent is 
low. In this case, the incumbent does not innovate if 
the public signal associated with silence ( )
S
  is high 
irrespective of the public signal associated with 
announcement ( )
A
 . When 
s
  is low, the incumbent 
finds it optimal to innovate while it preannounces 
only for moderate levels of 
A
 . Figure 2b, illustrates 
how the no innovation region (Strategy S) shrinks as 
the strength of private signal improves and is in the 
moderate range while this region vanishes when the 
private signal is high. Further, for a given 
A
 , the 
innovating firm remains silent for moderate values of  
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 s
 and preannounces otherwise. Figure 2c is 
consistent with our understanding from Proposition 3 
and Figures 1 and 2. We use the following 
parameters for numerical illustrations in Figures 1, 2 
and 3. 
2, 0.5, 0.2, 0.5, 2.2, 2, 0.1.
i e
t              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Fig. 2a 0.4                           Fig. 2b. 0.5   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2c. 0.9   
Figure 2. Preannouncement strategies for 
variation in public signals for different private 
signals. 
 
Next we analyze the role of network effect parameter 
on the incumbent’s preannouncement strategy. 
 
  
Fig. 3a. 
0.6,  0.2,  0.6.
A S
    
 
Fig. 3b. 
0.2,  0.6,  0.6.
A S
    
  
Figure 3. Preannouncement strategies for 
variation in network effect parameters. 
 
    Proposition 4: Innovation is optimal for the 
incumbent if the ability of the new entrant to leverage 
network effect is low. 
 
 In Figure 3, we use similar parameters as in Figure 2 
to identify the incumbent’s optimal preannouncement 
strategy. Competing firms may have different 
abilities to leverage network effects. This is captured 
by the network effect parameters
i
  and
e
 . These 
parameters impact consumer’s utility. We find that 
when the entrant has higher ability to leverage 
network effect compared to the incumbent ( )
e i
  , 
there exists a preannouncement strategy where the 
incumbent innovates only for low values of 
e
 . This 
is because high network effect parameters negatively 
impact firm’s pricing and its ability to profit as 
discussed in Proposition 1. 
 
6. Conclusion  
      
     In technology product networks with switching 
costs, incumbent networks often use preemption 
strategies like the preannouncement of future 
technologies in order to dissuade users from 
migrating to the new entrant with superior 
technology. However, not all preemption strategies 
succeed. While some firms are better off making 
committed preannouncements, others find remaining 
silent to be the best strategy. However, based on the 
several factors like firm’s reputation, the saturation of 
technology, speculation on social media and other 
channels a public perception regarding the success of 
the incumbent is created. Managing expectations has 
become increasingly difficult in the presence of 
social media. Such media channels often generate 
inaccurate perceptions leading to market pessimism 
or optimism. The firm however has private 
information regarding the success of its product and 
must take into consideration such private signal in 
order to design its preannouncement strategy. 
     We use a stylized model to understand the impact 
of uncertainties in public and private signals and 
network effects on preannouncement strategies. We 
find that the incumbent follows a preannouncement 
strategy (truthful or silent) if the public signal 
associated with it is moderate. Further, network 
effects has a negative impact on prices and 
incumbent may innovate only if the entrant’s relative 
ability to leverage network effects is low. Possible 
extensions of this research could analyze the impact 
of asymmetric evaluation of the public signal by the 
entrant and consumers on preannouncement 
strategies. In absence of empirical or theoretical work 
to understand preannouncement strategies under 
uncertainties that mark modern settings in the age of 
social media, the insights from this paper provide 
early contribution to this area of research. 
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APPENDIX: Proofs of Propositions 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Equating utilities of the 
indifferent consumer in equation(1.1), we derive the 
equilibrium market share of the incumbent for 
strategy A  as follows 
 
2 2
2
2
e A i A e i e
A
i e
p p t
m
t

 
      

 
 
Simultaneously solving the first order condition of 
the profit functions in equation(1.2), the equilibrium 
prices are 
2
3 2
3
i e i e
i A
t
p
      
  
2
3 2 ( )
3
i e i e
e A
t
p
      
  
Similarly, from equations (1.3) and (1.4), 
2
3 2
3
i e e
i A
t
p
    
  
2
3 2
3
i e e
e A
t
p
    
  
We can compute similar pricing for strategy SI .  
For strategy S , from equations(1.5) and (1.6), we can 
derive the equilibrium stage 2 prices for silent 
strategy as follows. 
2
3 2
3
i e e
i S
t
p
    
  
2
3 2
3
i e e
e S
t
p
    
  
For a given strategy  , ,k A SI S ,   
2 2 2
2 1
1,  ,  .
3 3
i k i k i k
i e
p p p
t  
  
    
  
   
 
Proof of Proposition 2: From equation(1.9), 
2
2
(1 2 )
3
i k
k
k
p 



 

 , 2 (1 2 )
3
i k
k
k
p 



 

. Thus, 
when 0.5
k
   , 2 20,  0i k e k
k k
p p
 
 
 
 
. Otherwise the 
prices decreases in the public signal. Similarly from 
equation(1.10), Proposition 2b follows. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: From the profit functions of 
the innovation strategy and no innovation strategy, 
we can derive ˆ  - the threshold above which 
innovation is optimal. When   is sufficiently high, 
in this region, we compare the profit functions of 
preannouncement and silent innovation to compute 
, , ,
A A S S
    . The expressions have been omitted in 
this version in the interest of space and are available 
upon request. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4:  The profit functions of the 
incumbent incorporates private signal for the 
probability of success of the innovation, and public 
signal by substituting prices derived in stage 1 and 2 
For preannouncement strategy  , ,k A SI S , the 
incumbent’s profit is given as follows.  
2
1 1 1 2 2
( (1 ) )
i k i k k i i k i k
p m            
We can derive the value of 
e
 that makes the 
incumbent indifferent between innovating and not 
innovating, i.e., 
1 1i A i S
  . Let us call this threshold 
eA
 . Similarly, 
eSI
 is the value of 
e
 that makes the 
incumbent indifferent between silent innovation and 
no innovation. Above this threshold, Silence is the 
dominant strategy and below this threshold the 
incumbent’s optimal strategy is to innovate (silently 
or with preannouncement).  
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